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SMART GROWTH AND AMERICAN LAND USE LAW 
RICHARD BRIFFAULT* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The smart growth movement that emerged in the late 1990’s seeks to 
change the way Americans think about growth, development, and urban 
planning.  From a legal perspective, smart growth directly challenges several 
fundamental aspects of American land use law. 
Substantively, smart growth attacks two goals that have been hallmarks of 
American land use law for more than three-quarters of a century: (1) 
decongestion, that is, reducing population density and dispersing residents over 
wider areas; and (2) the separation of different land uses from each other.  
Both decongestion and separation of uses were enshrined in the Standard 
Zoning Enabling Act of 1922, which provides the legal basis for most zoning 
in the United States.  These goals were validated by the Supreme Court as 
legitimate aims of state and local land use regulation in the landmark Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty1 decision of 1926.  Decongestion of population and 
separation of land uses have been critical features of American land use law 
ever since. 
Smart growth, by contrast, would limit the dispersal of population in order 
to prevent the loss of open space and reduce the need for the installation of 
costly infrastructure in newly developed areas.  Higher densities would also 
facilitate the use of mass transit and hold down the energy and environmental 
costs associated with high levels of automotive transportation.  Smart growth 
also challenges the separation of uses and would instead promote the greater 
integration of commercial and residential uses and of different types of 
residential uses.  This, too, would reduce transportation costs while promoting 
more socially and economically balanced communities. 
To implement these goals, smart growth would change certain 
longstanding institutional features of American land use law.  Traditionally, 
 
* Vice-Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.  An 
earlier version of this article was presented at the Conference on Smart Growth and the Law, 
George Washington University Center on Sustainability and Regional Growth, September 21, 
2000. 
 1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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state governments have delegated broad authority to local governments to 
regulate the land within their borders.  In recent decades, some states have 
sought to exercise greater control over local discretion with respect to some 
aspects of land use regulation.  But in most states and for most land use issues, 
localities dominate the field.  One consequence is that land use decisions are 
shaped primarily by the concerns of small local jurisdictions that, typically, do 
not take into account the effect of their land use actions on other localities or 
the metropolitan area as a whole.  Moreover, the delegation of zoning and 
subdivision power to local governments contributes to the separation of land 
use decision-making from other critically important concerns, such as 
transportation policy, economic development strategies, and environmental 
protection.  These are issues that are handled primarily at the state or regional 
levels.  Yet, land use policies affect and, in turn, are affected by transportation, 
economic development, and environmental regulation.  As a result, local 
control over land use complicates state efforts to develop and implement 
comprehensive metropolitan area development plans. 
Smart growth challenges both the local focus of land use decision-making 
and the isolation of land use regulation from other concerns.  Smart growth 
would generally require that land use actions take regional considerations into 
account, and that land use regulation be more closely integrated with 
transportation, environmental, and economic development policy-making. 
In this essay, I will attempt to sketch out the principal features of American 
land use law.  My goal is to provide a sense of how great a departure smart 
growth would be from the longstanding American way of regulating land use.  
I will initially focus on the substantive land use policies that smart growth 
seeks to change, but my primary concern will be the tension between smart 
growth and local control over land use decision-making.  Smart growth will be 
difficult to achieve at the local level.  Most local governments contain only a 
small fraction of the land and population of the metropolitan areas in which 
they are located.  Even if individual local governments are willing to adopt 
smart growth principles and restrict the development of undeveloped land, 
promote greater densities in already developed areas, or permit the integration 
of commercial and residential structures, the benefits of their actions may be 
limited if most other localities in the metropolitan area adhere to other land use 
values.  The determinations of which areas are ripe for development, which 
areas should be protected from development, and what are appropriate 
development densities need to take regional considerations into account.  So, 
too, smart growth seeks the greater integration of land use decision-making 
with transportation, water supply, waste treatment, economic development, and 
environmental protection policies that are regional in scope.  Smart growth 
may be able to achieve some successes at the local level, but ultimately some 
regionalization of land use decision-making will be necessary if smart growth 
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is to succeed in creating more economically balanced communities.  Yet, as I 
will also suggest, a combination of pragmatic and principled concerns indicate 
that smart growth will have to accept a considerable, continuing role for local 
governments in land use regulation. 
II.  THE SUBSTANTIVE VALUES OF AMERICAN LAND USE LAW 
The substantive law of American land use regulation has been dominated 
by two themes – holding down densities and separating different types of uses.  
Not every local government pursues these policies, but these norms marked 
land use decision-making in most parts of the country, particularly the growing 
portions of metropolitan areas, for most of the twentieth century. 
Density Control: The movement from greater to lesser density is not solely 
a product of law.  Decongestion, in tandem with its opposite, the concentration 
of people and economic activity in cities, has long been a feature of American 
life.  People began crowding into our cities in the 18th century, drawn there by 
economic opportunity, cultural attractions, and the relatively greater degree of 
personal freedom available in the anonymous city compared with small town 
and rural areas.  Yet, urban crowding and congestion have their costs in terms 
of reduced living space, reduced control over one’s immediate environment, 
and loss of quiet, clean air, and various other environmental amenities.  With 
improvements in transportation and communications in the 19th century, 
people began to be able to work in cities and thereby benefit from urban 
economic and cultural opportunities, while also enjoying the benefits of 
making their homes outside the congested urban core. 
According to historian Kenneth Jackson, the commuter suburbs began with 
the onset of regular ferry service between lower Manhattan and the then 
bucolic community of Brooklyn in 1814.2  Subsequent developments in 
transportation technologies—railroads, street cars, trolleys—enabled more and 
more people to combine the economic and cultural benefits of access to the 
cities with the greater living space and reduced crowding of suburban life.  
New forms of transportation and communication also made it feasible for some 
industries to relocate from the costly and congested urban core to less dense 
suburban areas without losing access to urban markets.  Although densely 
populated cities still dominated the urban scene in the early twentieth century, 
lower-density suburbs had begun to emerge as important components of many 
metropolitan areas. 
Density control became a part of the law of land use regulation with the 
widespread introduction of zoning.  Although a number of localities had 
adopted zoning ordinances before World War I, local zoning did not become a 
 
 2. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 25-32 (1985). 
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central feature of land use regulation until the 1920’s.  In 1921, the United 
States Department of Commerce appointed an Advisory Committee on Zoning 
which, in 1922, released a model law which it intended the states to use to 
grant local governments authority to zone.  Within three years of its release, 
nineteen states had adopted the Standard Zoning Enabling Act (“SZEA”) in 
whole or part.  Today zoning enabling laws exist in virtually every state. 
Section one of the SZEA announces that zoning is a grant of power to, 
inter alia,  “regulate and restrict . . . the density of population.” Moreover, 
dominating the “purposes in view” section of the Act are the goals of 
“lessen[ing] congestion in the streets,” “prevent[ing] overcrowding of land,” 
and “avoid[ing] undue concentration of population.”3  In its notes, the 
Advisory Commission explained that “[t]he power to regulate density of 
population is comparatively new in zoning practice.  It is, however, highly 
desirable.” 
The courts quickly validated the SZEA’s commitment to enabling local 
governments to regulate density.  The Supreme Court of Illinois, in City of 
Aurora v. Burns,4 a 1925 zoning case, held that “the constantly increasing 
density of our urban populations” was a legitimate basis for regulating land use 
and that regulation to “prevent congestion of population” was a valid exercise 
of the police power.5  One year later, the Supreme Court of the United States, 
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, agreed.6 
Density reduction, or, more accurately, density prevention, became a 
central feature of zoning in mid-century, particularly in the rapidly growing 
suburbs outside the large cities of the Northeast and Midwest.  A leading 
supporter of suburban efforts to hold down density was the New Jersey 
Supreme Court.  Deeply concerned by what it called the “tide of suburban 
development”7 spreading out from New York City, Newark, and Philadelphia 
after World War II, the New Jersey Supreme Court—later a leading critic of 
suburban exclusionary zoning—endorsed the repeated efforts of New Jersey’s 
localities to hold down densities through the adoption of steadily expanding 
minimum floor space, building frontage, and large lot acreage requirements—
in one case as large as five acres.8  In the 1952 decision of Lionshead Lake v. 
 
 3. ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, §§ 1-3 (1924), reprinted in 
PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS NO. 9, § 53B.01 (1978). 
 4. 149 N.E. 784 (Ill. 1925). 
 5. Id. at 788. 
 6. 272 U.S. 365, 392 (1926). 
 7. Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester Township, 181 A.2d 129, 136 (N.J. 1962). 
 8. Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 139 A.2d 749, 753 (N.J. 1958) (prohibition of 
multi-family dwellings); Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 93 A.2d 378, 384 (N.J. 1952) (five-
acre lot requirements); Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 89 A.2d 693, 695-98 (N.J. 
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Township of Wayne,9 the court explained that residents of zoning communities 
could pursue “more land, more living room, indoors and out, and more 
freedom of scale of living than is generally possible in the city.”10 
Nor was New Jersey alone in providing judicial validation for suburban 
zoning ordinances aimed at limiting density.  Courts in states from 
Massachusetts to Missouri agreed that the preservation of the “quiet and beauty 
of rural surroundings,”11 the requirement of “nice homes,”12 and the control of 
local public service costs all justified land use policies aimed at holding down 
density, separating houses from each other and requiring the dispersal of new 
residents over relatively large land areas.13 
The courts in the postwar decades did not see these local zoning measures 
as raising issues of interlocal or regional significance.  The interests of 
prospective residents, excluded by these restrictions from membership in the 
zoning communities, were largely ignored.  Also frequently disregarded was 
the impact locally restrictive ordinances would have in forcing new 
development on other communities within the metropolitan area.  Rather, the 
courts usually saw only a conflict between private property rights of 
landowners and the public interest of the local community.  The courts 
generally deferred to the authority of local decision-makers to define and 
enforce a local public interest in density control. 
Judicial attitudes in several states—New York,14 California,15 
Pennsylvania,16 and most famously New Jersey17—began to change in the 
1970’s.  In a series of cases involving local large lot requirements or 
exclusions of apartment buildings, courts acknowledged that local density 
controls often operated as a form of social and economic exclusion.  The value 
of density control per se was never challenged by the courts.  But in a number 
of cases where courts found that local measures resulted in the exclusion of 
low and moderate income families from the zoning communities, and 
 
1952) (minimum floor space requirements for residential dwellings); Vickers, 181 A.2d at 138-40 
(ban on mobile homes). 
 9. 89 A.2d 693 (N.J. 1952). 
 10. Id. at 697. 
 11. Simon v. Town of Needham, 42 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Mass. 1942). 
 12. Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 246 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Mo. 1952). 
 13. See generally Zygmont v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n of Greenwich, 210 A.2d 172 
(Conn. 1965); Honeck v. County of Cook, 146 N.E.2d 35 (Ill. 1957); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Bd. of 
Adjustment of Easttown Township, 141 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1958). 
 14. See Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1975). 
 15. See Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 
P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976). 
 16. See Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Providence, 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977). 
 17. See Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 
713 (N.J. 1975). 
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indirectly led to higher housing costs in the region as a whole, the courts 
invalidated those restrictions.  Communities were required to address the 
impact of low densities on regional housing opportunities, and the New Jersey 
Supreme Court directed developing suburbs to accept their “fair share” of 
regional low and moderate income housing.  However, once a community 
accepted its fair share it could continue to restrict densities.  A number of state 
legislatures—Connecticut, Massachusetts, and, under judicial prodding, New 
Jersey—also adopted laws designed to ameliorate local exclusionary zoning.  
But as with the state courts, the state legislative goal was primarily the local 
acceptance of a fair share of regional affordable housing needs not an attack on  
the value of density control. 
It is not clear how much success these state legislative and judicial 
challenges to local exclusionary zoning have had, and in many states there 
have been neither legislative nor judicial efforts to curtail local exclusionary 
measures.  Thus, although the critique of exclusionary zoning did have some 
effect in limiting in some states the more extreme versions of density 
controls—such as very large lot requirements—density limitation still remains 
an important zoning goal in most states. 
Separation of Uses: If decongestion began as a social goal, facilitated by 
transportation and communications technologies and then reinforced by law, 
the separation of land uses is more clearly a product of legal action.  
Traditionally, in American cities multiple land uses—residential, commercial, 
and industrial—were close together, cheek by jowl.  The emergence of the 
residential suburb began to change this, but even in many of these 
communities, residences of various types coexisted with multiple, albeit small-
scale, commercial activities.  In the early twentieth century, all-residential 
communities began to emerge through private agreements between developers 
and buyers.  These restrictive covenants limited the use of land subject to the 
covenants to residences, and, often, to single-family homes.  The role of 
restrictive covenants suggests some public support for the separation of 
residences, especially single-family homes, from other forms of land uses.  But 
private agreements could bind only the lots initially controlled by a single 
landowner or developer, and not other lots within the locality.  As a result, the 
legal separation of residential activity from all other activity—and the 
exclusion of multi-family dwellings from single-family home neighborhoods—
did not really come into its own until after the widespread adoption of zoning. 
A central goal of the SZEA was to provide for the creation of separate 
districts “for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.”18  At an early stage, 
the differences among these districts became highly articulated, with relatively 
 
 18. ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, § 1 (1924), reprinted in 
PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS NO. 9, § 53B.01 (1978). 
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refined distinctions between related land uses.  The ordinance before the 
Supreme Court in Euclid was enacted in 1922 by a community with a 
population, estimated by the Court, at just 5,000 to 10,000.19  Yet the Euclid 
ordinance provided for six separate use districts—and these districts separated 
schools and public libraries from banks and offices, while further separating 
hardware, drug, and grocery stores from laundries and dry cleaners.  Most 
strikingly, the ordinance placed one-family homes in a separate district from 
two-family homes; two-family homes, in turn, were in a different district from 
apartment houses.20 
The Supreme Court held that these fine distinctions were appropriate 
exercises of the police power.  The Court drew on the common law of 
nuisance, noting that uses could be separated to prevent one legitimate use 
from impinging on another.  But the zoning in Euclid went well beyond what 
was necessary for nuisance prevention.21  The Village of Euclid was not trying 
to separate homes from brick kilns and slaughterhouses;22 rather, it was 
separating homes from grocery stores and single-family homes from other 
types of residences. 
The separation of differing land uses remains a hallmark of local zoning to 
this day.  Over time it has become more arcane and byzantine, with many 
communities having dozens of zones and subzones containing more and more 
narrowly homogeneous uses.  To some extent the separation of uses reflects a 
desire for predictability and investment security.  With finely articulated 
zoning, you can know exactly how the parcels in the vicinity of your land will 
be used.  This is valuable to landowners, as well as to the banks, mortgage 
lenders and insurers that finance the purchase of land.  The separation of uses 
may also provide a means of dealing with economic and social conflict; one 
way to enable different, potentially conflicting groups to coexist in a 
community is to separate them from each other.  Certainly, the most refined 
zoning systems reflect the high-modernist hubris—to use the term coined by 
political scientist James Scott—that the separation of uses would rationalize 
community form and provide both a scientific and an aesthetic improvement 
over the disorderly mix of residential, commercial, and industrial activities that 
marked traditional communities.23 
Separation of uses, along with reduction of densities, valorized the single-
family home, by separating it, and thereby protecting it, from all other uses 
 
 19. 272 U.S. at 379. 
 20. Id. at 380-83. 
 21. Id. at 387 (law of nuisances not “controlling” in determining validity of zoning). 
 22. Cf. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding Los Angeles ordinance 
excluding brick kiln from residential area). 
 23. See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE 
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (Yale Univ. Press 1998). 
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including, in Justice Sutherland’s Euclid opinion, that most insidious use, the 
apartment house.  Although technically a residence, the apartment house, 
Sutherland explained, was “a mere parasite, constructed in order to take 
advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the 
residential character of the district.”24  Apartment buildings, by their height and 
bulk, interfere with light and air, and result in increased traffic and noise so 
that “the residential character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a 
place of detached residences are utterly destroyed.”25 
In the decades following Euclid, courts regularly upheld local zoning 
ordinances that required larger and larger homes, larger and larger lots, and the 
exclusion of nonresidential activities and apartment buildings from one-family 
home areas.  As Justice William O. Douglas asserted 50 years later in Village 
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, urban zoning may legitimately embrace a pastoral 
vision that separates the home from all other activity: “The police power is not 
confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places.  It is ample to lay 
out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet 
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.”26 
Even more than decongestion, the separation of uses has remained an 
unquestioned feature of land use law.  The attack on exclusionary zoning 
called into question the legitimacy of the complete exclusion of apartment 
buildings and multifamily residences from whole communities.  In effect, the 
courts and legislatures concerned about the impact of local zoning on housing 
opportunities were pointing out what should have been obvious—that 
apartments are residences, too.  (The notion that apartments are not really 
residential remains deeply entrenched in state property tax systems which 
usually provide the lowest assessment rates for residential property, but 
typically classify apartments as commercial and not residential).  Until the 
arrival of the New Urbanism movement in the 1990’s, however, the separation 
of residential from retail and office uses was a widespread and virtually 
unchallenged aspect of land use law.  Even the limited judicial and legislative 
insistence on the inclusion of some multifamily dwellings in some 
communities did not question the physical separation within a community of 
those dwellings from single-family homes. 
III.  LOCAL CONTROL 
Linked to the substance of American land use law is its institutional focus 
on local governments.  Local governments have been preeminent in land use 
regulation as they have been in no other area of American law.  Local 
 
 24. Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] SMART GROWTH AND AMERICAN LAND USE LAW 261 
 
governments play the major role in providing most public services, like 
education and public order.  But in those areas, local governments are often 
limited to implementing the decisions of higher level governments.  States may 
promulgate the curricula that local teachers teach, and states adopt the criminal 
laws that local police enforce.  In land use, however, local governments 
frequently both make the laws and carry them out. 
To be sure, local governments do not act alone in the land use arena.  
Federal and state tax, transportation, infrastructure assistance, and 
environmental policies have long had an impact on land use.  Government 
mortgage subsidies and intergovernmental grants for new highways, water 
supply systems, and wastewater treatment and removal facilitated suburban 
growth.  At the heart of zoning, the Standard Zoning Enabling Act nicely 
reflects the interpenetration of federal, state and local governments.  The Act 
was drafted and publicized by a committee appointed by the United States 
Secretary of Commerce—Herbert Hoover.  It was enacted by state legislatures, 
whose imprimatur was legally necessary for local action.  The focus of federal 
and state governments, however, was on delegating zoning authority to local 
governments.  Once they were empowered with zoning authority in the 1920’s, 
local governments have dominated the land use field. 
Local control of zoning was directly questioned and affirmed in Euclid.  
The parties seeking to invalidate Euclid’s ordinance, in an argument 
foreshadowing the contemporary regionalist critique of local zoning, stressed 
that Euclid was “a mere suburb of the city of Cleveland”27 and thus, not really 
a freestanding community.  They argued that industrial development shunted 
from the Euclid district zoned residential would simply be diverted to other 
sites in the Cleveland metropolitan area.  The Supreme Court, however, 
rejected the implied claim that Euclid was too small a piece of the Cleveland 
region to be allowed to zone autonomously.  “The village, though physically a 
suburb of Cleveland, is politically a separate municipality, with powers of its 
own and authority to govern itself as it sees fit, within the limits of the organic 
law of its creation and the state and federal Constitutions.”28 
Later cases also addressed the legal legitimacy of zoning undertaken by a 
suburb that was only a small piece of a larger metropolitan area.  Rather than 
question the propriety of local zoning, some courts actually relied on the small 
size of suburbs relative to their metropolitan area to expand local zoning 
authority.  The theory of zoning is that it separates uses within a jurisdiction, 
not that it completely excludes lawful activities.  But some suburbs sought to 
zone themselves as exclusively residential communities.  In one leading case, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a locality’s total exclusion of heavy 
 
 27. Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389. 
 28. Id. 
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industry by treating the town as a mere residential fragment.  The Court would 
not rely on what it called “the adventitious location of municipal boundaries”29 
to bar the borough of Cresskill from excluding industry since the region’s 
industrial needs could still be satisfied with an all-residential Cresskill if 
factories were located elsewhere in the region.  In effect, Cresskill could rely 
on its small size to turn itself into a residential zone within a larger region. 
Similarly, a federal court of appeals upheld the total exclusion of industry 
from the residential town of Valley View, Ohio.  “Traditional concepts of 
zoning,” wrote then appeals court judge and future Supreme Court Justice 
Potter Stewart, “envision a municipality as a self-contained community with its 
own residential, business, and industrial areas.  It is obvious that Valley View, 
Ohio, on the periphery of a large metropolitan center, is not such a self-
contained community, but only an adventitious fragment of the economic and 
social whole.”30  Yet, that did not undermine the legitimacy of Valley View’s 
zoning ordinance.  Rather, given that the business and industrial needs of its 
inhabitants could be “supplied by other accessible areas in the community at 
large,”31—as the Court presumed—Valley View could zone itself exclusively 
residential. 
The local role in land use regulation takes a specific form.  It consists 
primarily of the power to say no.  A local government cannot force a particular 
development to occur within the locality.  It cannot actually require a high-tech 
incubator office park, a shopping mall, or a high-end residential developer to 
invest within its borders.  The locality can take actions that make it an 
attractive place to outsiders, but it cannot compel outsiders to relocate there.  
Moreover, many localities, particularly smaller communities, have relatively 
limited tools for drawing new development.32  Market forces and federal and 
state actions affecting the location and cost of transportation, air quality, water 
supply, or environmental protection play a major role in affecting where 
attractive development will occur. 
But local governments, deploying subdivision controls and zoning, 
generally have the power to veto unwanted developments.  This fits well with 
the substantive goals of land use regulation, since local governments can use 
their veto power to block development deemed excessively dense, or 
development that inappropriately combines residential and commercial activity 
or single-family homes with multi-family residences. 
 
 29. Duffcon Concrete Prods. v. Borough of Cresskill, 64 A.2d 347, 350 (N.J. 1949). 
 30. Valley View Vill. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412, 418 (6th Cir. 1955). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., MARK SCHNEIDER, THE COMPETITIVE CITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
SUBURBIA (Univ. of Pittsburgh Press 1989). 
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The power to veto is, of course, of differential value to different local 
governments.  It is of limited value for cities and communities that desire new 
development and the jobs and tax base that economic development can bring.  
For central cities and declining older suburbs, the development veto is 
relatively useless since they want to encourage development not to block it.  
However, for more affluent suburbs, communities satisfied with their current 
level of development and fearful of more growth, or localities that want to 
exclude more than they want to include, the local veto is extremely valuable, 
indeed.  Of course, given the small size of local governments and the 
fragmentation of metropolitan areas, an exclusionary locality may be adjacent 
to a poorer one that is willing to accept some of the development its more 
affluent neighbor would reject.  As a result, even for affluent suburbs the 
benefits of the local veto may be undermined by lack of control over 
developments in nearby areas.  Still, the local veto enables affluent suburbs to 
create at least some distance between themselves and land uses they deem 
undesirable. 
Local control of land use is deeply intertwined with two other features of 
American local government law—local responsibility for raising the revenues 
necessary to fund local services and the incorporation and boundary rules that 
make it easy for new local governments to form but difficult for existing local 
governments to expand. 
Fiscally, American local governments, unlike local governments in many 
other Western countries, raise from their own resources most of the money for 
the services they provide.  Roughly two-thirds of local budgets consist of own-
source revenues; only the remaining one-third reflects assistance from the state 
and federal governments.33  Fiscal factors, thus, have a strong influence over 
how local governments exercise their land use powers.  Local governments 
have an incentive to permit only those land uses that generate more in taxes 
than they cost in local services.  This reinforces the attraction of large lots and 
single-family home requirements since these hold down population and the 
demand for costly services, while increasing property values and, thus, 
property tax revenues—the major source of local own-source funds.  
Conversely, there is a fiscal incentive to exclude apartment houses and homes 
 
 33. In 1996-97, the last year for which data is available, local governments (including 
counties, municipalities, townships, school districts, and special districts) raised $887 billion, of 
which $47 billion came from the federal government and $267 billion from the states.  Local 
governments raised $573 billion of local revenue (including $41 billion transferred from some 
local governments to others, primarily from general purpose local governments to school and 
special districts).  The locally-raised share of total local revenues is, thus, approximately 65%. 
See 1997 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENT, VOL. I, GOVERNMENT FINANCES (2000).  The relative mix 
of local own-source revenues and intergovernmental assistance varies significantly from state to 
state and among localities within a particular state. 
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affordable by low and moderate income people since these may produce less in 
new revenue than they cost in locally-funded expenditures.  In states where 
local governments can levy a sales tax—or piggyback a local increment on a 
state sales tax—localities have an incentive to promote retail activities such as 
shopping malls as those uses generate sales tax revenues. 
Fiscal pressures are playing a growing role in local land use decision 
making.  The tax revolt sparked and symbolized by California’s Proposition 13 
in 1978 and Massachusetts’ Proposition 2 ½ in 1980 led to the adoption of new 
caps on property tax yields and/or on the rate of increase in property tax 
revenues in many states.34  With many localities unable to fully realize the 
benefits of increased property development, they may be even less interested in 
permitting new growth.  More generally, local governments have become more 
skeptical about the fiscal benefits of new growth and more attentive to the 
costs of providing the new infrastructure—highways, water supply, wastewater 
treatment and removal, and schools—that new development frequently 
requires.35 
While this recognition of the infrastructure costs of growth resonates with 
concerns voiced by the smart growth movement, it remains to be seen whether 
local infrastructure cost pressures will lead localities to promote denser, mixed 
use developments or, instead, seek to maintain existing land use patterns by 
placing more of the cost of development on newcomers through the use of 
development impact fees.  For now, at least, many local governments appear to 
favor the latter approach.  As a result, local resistance to growth and local fees 
intended to make growth pay for itself may simply force new development 
further to the urban fringe where land costs are lower, landowners are eager to 
reap the benefits of selling to developers, or there is sufficient excess capacity 
in local roads, schools, or water systems to accommodate new development.  
The increased salience of local fiscal concerns could, thus, reinforce both the 
affordability problem produced by zoning restrictions that drive up housing 
costs and the sprawling pattern of metropolitan regional development. 
The other feature of local government formation that is critical for 
assessing local land use controls is the sheer multiplicity of local governments.  
“In 1987, the typical metropolitan area had 113 local governments, including 
forty-seven general purpose governments, such as a county or a 
municipality.”36  The profusion of governments is even greater in larger 
metropolitan areas.  There are over 1250 local governments in the Chicago 
 
 34. See, e.g., ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN ET AL., PROPERTY TAXES AND TAX REVOLTS: THE 
LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 13 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995). 
 35. See, e.g., ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSÉ A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS 62-96 (Brookings Inst. 1993). 
 36. See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1120 (1996). 
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area, including 6 counties and more than 100 municipalities; more than 300 
local governments in greater Seattle, including 3 counties and 65 cities and 
towns; and approximately 350 local governments, including 168 cities and 
towns, in metropolitan Boston.  Even in the Sunbelt, which tends to have fewer 
localities per metropolitan area, the Phoenix area has 138 governments, 
including 21 municipalities.37 
The large number of local governments is a product of laws in many states 
that make it easy for people in unincorporated areas to form new governments, 
and that make it difficult for existing local governments to annex 
unincorporated areas or to consolidate with other localities, Moreover, because 
the power to zone has been broadly extended to most incorporated localities it 
provides an incentive to community incorporation, much as loss of local 
control over zoning leads localities to resist consolidation into larger units.38 
The large number of relatively small local governments in close proximity 
to each other affects the nature of local land use decision-making in 
metropolitan areas.  Many of these localities are composed of economically 
and ethnically homogeneous homeowners, and local zoning politics is 
dominated by homeowner interests.  This tends to privatize zoning, to focus it 
on the immediate interests of local homeowners, with the consequences for the 
broader and more economically and ethnically diverse region frequently 
ignored in the process.  If local homeowners would be better off with a 
development restriction then the restriction is likely to be adopted, even if the 
region as a whole would benefit from a less restrictive decision. 
With metropolitan areas composed of large numbers of small abutting 
governments, local decisions frequently generate effects beyond their borders.  
This undermines both the efficiency of local decision-making, since external 
effects will only rarely be taken into account by localities, and the democratic 
nature of local decision-making, since people beyond local boundaries who are 
affected by these decisions are unrepresented in the local decision-making 
process. 
Land use decisions affect concerns that by their very nature transcend local 
borders—air and water pollution, water supply, open space and habitat 
conservation, transportation systems that need to connect people throughout a 
region.  These often cannot be solved by the unilateral actions of individual 
local governments.  Moreover, the multiplicity of small local governments 
with many different and often conflicting interests make it difficult for local 
governments to reach cooperative solutions.  The states have responded to 
some of these questions by shifting decision-making in these areas to state or 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 346, 366-74 (1990). 
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regional bodies—regional water or solid waste authorities, transportation 
authorities, and environmental regulators.  But that creates new problems for 
coordinating regional decisions concerning physical infrastructure with local 
decisions affecting land use.  For example, local decisions that result in 
dispersed settlement tend to undermine the ability of regional transportation 
authorities to promote public transit. 
Local land use decision-making also tends to reflect and reinforce the 
physical and jurisdictional separation of rich and poor, and of black and white.  
To be sure, market forces alone would make it difficult for many low and 
moderate income people to live in more affluent suburban towns.  But local 
land use regulations frequently aggravate the problem by imposing 
development fees and zoning requirements that drive up local housing costs. 
In many ways, local control over land use seems to be increasingly at odds 
with the regional character of metropolitan life.  Metropolitan area residents do 
not concentrate their activities within their home towns, nor do metropolitan 
area businesses typically draw most of their workers or customers from the 
particular city or town in which they are situated.  Regions increasingly operate 
as economic units in competition with other regional units around the country 
and around the world for new investment.  Regional competitiveness is 
affected by the availability of land for economic development, housing costs, 
transportation systems, and access to open space.  Local control, however, 
means that land use decisions which affect regional competitiveness and 
regional well-being are being made at the local level, by local decision-makers 
who lack the incentives or even the information necessary to make decisions 
that take regional interests into account.39 
Despite the increasingly uncertain fit between local control over land use 
and the regional scale of metropolitan life, local control remains a durable 
feature of American land use decision-making.  Its persistence is particularly 
striking given the formal legal inferiority of cities and counties in our 
government hierarchy.  Local governments have no inherent powers.  Local 
governments wield their authority over zoning, subdivision approvals, and 
development fees due to grants of power from their states—grants which the 
states could take back at any time.  Although most states provide many of their 
local governments with home rule, home rule rarely provides local 
governments with legal protections from state legislation generally reducing 
local powers, as opposed to state laws aimed at individual local governments.  
Home rule’s principal legal effect has been to increase local power to adopt 
new measures and engage in local law-making without first obtaining specific 
state authorization.  In other words, it is more a sword than a shield.  When the 
state chooses to preempt or displace local authority, home rule generally 
 
 39. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 36, at 1132-44. 
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provides little protection.  In the few states where home rule does protect 
localities from state intervention or restriction, the home rule shield applies to 
purely local matters only.  Matters of state concern can be regulated by the 
state even if state action also affects local interests.  Given the external effects 
of local land use regulation, as well as the state’s interest in promoting regional 
development, the states would have little legal difficulty in taking over land 
use regulation or displacing local land use autonomy should they choose to do 
so. 
The 1970’s witnessed a partial reexamination of local control over land 
use. In New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and California local 
exclusionary zoning was attacked in state courts on the grounds that these local 
regulations limited housing opportunities and unfairly forced unwanted 
development on other localities.40  Courts in these states acknowledged the 
regional consequences of local zoning actions, condemned local parochialism, 
and required local governments to take regional housing needs into account 
when regulating land use.41  But these cases had only a limited effect on land 
use regulation.  Only in New Jersey did the courts engage in a sustained attack 
on local exclusionary zoning, and even in New Jersey the state supreme court 
indicated that its ultimate goal was local acceptance of a share of regional 
housing needs rather than a broader displacement of local zoning autonomy.  
In the other states, the courts occasionally invalidated the most egregious 
instances of local actions intended to drive up the cost of new housing, but 
generally did not disturb local control over land use regulation.42 
The 1970’s and 1980’s were also marked by the so-called “quiet 
revolution” in land use control, with states from Vermont to Florida to Hawaii 
becoming more involved in land use decision-making.  A number of states 
provided for greater state administrative involvement in standard-setting, 
oversight mechanisms, and even substantive requirements for local regulators.  
These, however, proved compatible with the preservation of considerable local 
decision-making authority.  States might require state or regional review of 
large project proposals that would have impacts in the region well beyond the 
zoning locality, and mandate the protection of environmentally sensitive areas 
from development. These initiatives tended to curb local power, but they were 
often consistent with the broader suburban residential interest in limiting 
densities and restricting growth.  In most states, the pattern of state activity 
 
 40. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government 
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41-58, 64-72 (1990). 
 41. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders Etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 487-
88 (Cal. 1976); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242-43 (N.Y. 1975); Surrick 
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105, 110 (Pa. 1977); Southern Burlington Co. NAACP v. 
Mount Laurel Township, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). 
 42. See Briffault, supra note 40, at 42-56. 
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involved targeted interventions, not a general retraction of the broad local 
power to act.  Moreover, many of these measures were aimed at limiting 
development and therefore were consistent with the growth control concerns of 
many suburban localities.  In short, although the trend in many states in the 
closing decades of the 20th century was in the direction of a greater state role, 
in most states local governments continued to dominate the land use field.  
Oregon, a state celebrated by smart growth advocates for its efforts to control 
local control over land use and to check sprawl, is the rare exception from the 
general pattern. 
Local control’s grip on land use is political, not legal or constitutional.  
Local control remains the dominant force in land use decision-making not so 
much because the law requires it as because most people want it that way.  
Why is local control so popular? 
First, local control provides a powerful means for enabling grass-roots 
participation in land-use decision-making, for assuring that elected and 
appointed decision-makers are accountable to the public, and for facilitating 
regulation that is responsive to a wide variety of differing local needs, 
circumstances, and conditions.  The regionalization of metropolitan life, by 
expanding the circle of those affected by local actions without expanding the 
circle of participation, has undermined the democratic nature of local control.  
But decision-making by small-scale communities still provides an important 
means of enabling the people most directly affected by land use actions to have 
their voices heard and their views taken into account. 
Second, land use regulation affects the home—the most important 
economic asset most families possess and the physical setting for family life.  
People have a powerful stake in controlling the political process that bears 
most directly on the economic value and social well-being of their homes.  In 
that sense, local control is a form of personal autonomy.  Indeed, the smaller 
the community, the greater the sense of the community as an extension of 
one’s self.  Although the benefits of local control have varied directly with the 
affluence and attractiveness of local communities, even residents of the poorest 
communities want the measure of control over their immediate environment 
that local land-use decision-making represents. 
Third, local control is the status quo.  People have invested in land under a 
certain institutional framework which they have come to know and understand.  
Even developers who chafe under current restrictions feel they know how the 
system works, who the players are, and what they need to do to succeed in 
their businesses.  With so much at stake, any change is unsettling, even a 
change which might ultimately improve the local quality of life or facilitate 
development. 
Local control, thus, brings together parochial self-interest, democratic and 
community values, and institutional inertia.  Challenging local control will be 
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difficult, and the values advanced by local control indicate that some continued 
local role in land use decision-making will be appropriate. 
IV.  SMART GROWTH AND LOCAL CONTROL 
Smart growth and local control are in tension, but they may not be 
necessarily at odds.  Some of the goals of smart growth—the promotion of 
mixed use development, the combination of higher densities in settled areas 
with the preservation of currently undeveloped farmland or open space—could 
be achieved by revising the substance of zoning regulation at the local level.  
Indeed, many localities have begun to promote denser nodes of urban 
development while protecting open space from further growth.  So, too, some 
localities have entered into interlocal agreements with their neighbors to 
promote greater land use consistency within their regions.43 
Conversely, a state takeover of land use regulation would not necessarily 
be marked by laws promoting mixed uses and high densities.  After all, it is 
state law—the SZEA—which initially provided that low-density development 
and the separation of land uses are legitimate local land use policies.  State 
subsidies for new water supply and sewage systems in rapidly growing areas 
on the metropolitan fringe and state policies in areas like transportation—
where most states have consistently favored highways over mass transit—have 
often been inconsistent with the goals of smart growth. 
Yet, it will be difficult to achieve smart growth if the existing local 
domination of land use decision-making is left undisturbed.  Sprawl results 
when developed localities try to limit new growth while localities on the urban 
fringe seek to attract new growth.  Each municipality may be acting rationally 
with respect to its own self-interest.  For the already developed municipality, 
new growth may mean greater density, more traffic, and higher public service 
costs, while for the less developed municipality, new growth could mean an 
increase in the value of local land and an enhancement of the local tax base.  
Each has a local incentive to pursue the policies that produce sprawl.  Some 
greater state or regional involvement in, or oversight of, land use decisions is 
necessary to check the self-interested local policies that may produce sprawl. 
More generally, most local governments constitute only tiny fragments of 
broader metropolitan areas.  Even if an individual local government were to 
permit greater densities, or the integration of commercial and residential 
uses—or the combination of apartments and single-family homes in a single 
zone—this would have only a limited impact on transportation patterns or 
environmental concerns in the region as a whole.  Smart growth requires a 
regional vision, and regional institutions and policy-making processes, in order 
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Compacts, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1011 (1999). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
270 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:253 
 
to more effectively integrate transportation policies, affordable housing 
policies, environmental protection, and land use regulation across metropolitan 
areas. 
Yet, smart growth is not necessarily hostile to local control.  Indeed, smart 
growth reflects a local as well as a regional vision.  Much of the power of the 
smart growth movement emerges from the sense that today’s suburbs lack the 
feeling of community found in older localities.  Greater density and a better 
mix of shops and homes, and of different types of homes, is intended not just 
to reduce commutation times and protect wetlands from development, but to 
restore the traditional urban patterns that are thought to facilitate the creation 
of public spaces and community centers within economically mixed 
communities. 
Smart growth, thus, needs to find a place for a continued local role in land 
use decision-making.  This is partly a matter of pragmatic politics.  Local 
control is deeply-rooted in our system and will not be easily dislodged.  States 
as well as local governments have long supported a strong role for local 
governments in land use regulation. 
But the reconciliation of a regional vision and a local role is also a matter 
of wise governance.  Local control is not only a political fact; it reflects 
important democratic values of participation, accountability, and 
responsiveness to public opinion.  Local control may no longer be congruent 
with the regional scope of planning and problems in contemporary 
metropolitan areas.  But a local voice in land use decision-making still remains 
a critical means for people to participate in decisions that affect their homes 
and neighborhoods.  Smart growth, thus, must develop institutional 
mechanisms for combining its regional and local visions, for coordinating the 
development of the region as a whole with providing a continuing role for 
people at the local level to participate in a significant way in the land use 
regulatory process. 
 
